Page 47 - 2020 Defence White Paper

a French commercial satellite. Under pressure from the international community, North Korea signed a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1991, followed by a
dispatch of an investigation team from IAEA the following year. However, the inspection fueled the
suspicion of North Korea’s nuclear development as the team identified material inconsistencies in the
nuclear activities declared by North Korea. The IAEA requested a special inspection for further
verification, which resulted in North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The Clinton administration considered all options, including military actions, but the nuclear issue came
1)
to a dramatic resolution with the conclusion of the US-North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework in
2)
1994. Under the framework, North Korea halted its nuclear activities until 2002.

Despite the agreement, however, North Korea covertly carried out a uranium enrichment program in
the mid-1990s with support from Pakistan. North Korea denied the existence of the program at first. In
2010, however, it invited Dr. Siegfried Hecker from the United States and revealed its uranium
enrichment facilities, raising concerns in the international community.
In 2002, the Bush administration withdrew from the agreed framework, citing the incompleteness of the
agreement and suspicion regarding North Korea’s uranium enrichment activities, and discontinued the
heavy oil supply and light-water plant construction. In response, North Korea also declared its withdrawal
from the framework and resumed production of nuclear materials after deporting IAEA inspectors,
reactivating the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods. Subsequently,
North Korea secured a significant amount of plutonium by reprocessing the spent rods twice in 2003
and 2005. Moreover, North Korea declared possession of nuclear weapons in February 2005, followed
by its first underground nuclear test in Punggyeri, Gilju-gun, North Hamgyong Province, in October 2006.
The ROK Meteorological Administration measured the strength of artificial seismic waves from the test
site at 3.9mb, indicating that the yield of the nuclear explosion was below 1kt. Based on the result of the
nuclear test, it was assessed that, although North Korea’s nuclear technology was not at the level of
nuclear weapon employment, the country had passed the threshold of manufacturing and detonating
nuclear explosive devices.

| Advancement of Nuclear Capabilities | Following its first nuclear test, North Korea spurred efforts to
advance its nuclear capabilities with focus on enhancing the power of its nuclear warheads, mounting
warheads on missiles, and achieving mass production. North Korea disabled key nuclear facilities in
Yongbyon during the Six-Party Talks until the end of 2008 and temporarily discontinued the production

1) In exchange for the abandonment of its nuclear development program by North Korea, the United States agreed to provide
heavy oil, construct two modern light-water reactor power plants, and normalize the US-North Korea relationship.
2) Adopted for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue after three meetings between high-ranking officials (October
21, 1994).

Appendix