Page 316 - 2018 Defense White Paper

North Korea came under suspicion when the Yongbyon nuclear complex was discovered by a French
commercial satellite in 1989. Pressured by the international community, North Korea signed a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1991, which sent a team for investigation
in 1992. However, the inspection fueled the suspicion of North Korea’s nuclear development as the team
identified material inconsistencies in the nuclear activities declared by North Korea. The IAEA requested a
special inspection for further verification that resulted in North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT). The Clinton administration considered all options, including military actions, but the nuclear
issue came to a dramatic resolution 2) with the signing of the U.S.–North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework in
1994. 3) Under the framework, North Korea temporarily froze its nuclear activities until 2002. However, despite
the agreement, in the mid-1990s, North Korea covertly carried out a uranium enrichment program with
support from Pakistan. North Korea denied the existence of the program at first. However, in 2010, it invited
Dr. Siegfried Hecker from the United States and revealed its uranium enrichment facilities raising concerns
in the international community.
In 2002, the Bush administration withdrew from the agreed framework citing the incompleteness of the
agreement and suspicion regarding North Korea’s uranium enrichment activities and discontinued the fuel
oil supply and light-water plant construction. In response, North Korea also declared its withdrawal from the
framework and resumed the production of nuclear materials after deporting IAEA inspectors, reactivating the
nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods. North Korea secured a significant
amount of plutonium by reprocessing the spent rods twice in 2003 and 2005. North Korea declared

possession of nuclear weapons in February 2005, followed by its first underground nuclear test in Punggye-
ri, Gilju-gun, North Hamgyong Province, in October 2006. The ROK Meteorological Administration measured
the strength of the seismic wave from the test site at 3.9 mb indicating that the yield of the nuclear explosion
was below 1 kt. Based on the result of the nuclear test, it was assessed that although North Korea’s nuclear
technology was not at the level of nuclear weapon employment, it had passed the threshold of manufacturing
and detonating nuclear explosive devices.

| Advancement of Nuclear Capabilities | Following its first nuclear test, North Korea spurred the
efforts to advance its nuclear capabilities with a focus on enhancing the power of its nuclear warheads,

2) In exchange for North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear development program, the United States agreed to
provide fuel oil, construct two modern light-water nuclear power plants, and normalize the U.S.–North Korea
relationship.
3) Adopted for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue after three meetings between high-ranking
officials (October 21, 1994).

314 Appendix