Page 37 - 2018 Defense White Paper
P. 37
| Sustainability | The Reserve Forces of North Korea are composed of the Reserve Military
Chapter 1
Training Unit, which is subject to combat mobilization; the workplace-based and regional
Worker-Peasant Red Guards; the Red Youth Guard, which is a military organization in high
schools; and paramilitary units. Those in the age range between 14 and 60 are subject to
mobilization, which correspond to 7,620,000 or roughly 30% of the population.
The Reserve Military Training Unit, which can augment the combat capability of the regular
armed forces during contingency, is 600,000 strong. The unit maintains a level of training
comparable to that of regular armed forces. The status of the reserve forces in North Korea is
shown in [Chart 1-8].
[ Chart 1-8 ] North Korean Reserve Forces
Category Strength Remark
Approx.
Total
7.62 million
Reserve Military Approx. Equivalent to the ROK’s mobilization reserve forces
Training Unit 600,000 (men aged 17– 50 years, women aged 17– 30 years)
Equivalent to the ROK’s homeland reserve forces
Worker-Peasant Approx.
(men aged 17– 60 years, women aged 17– 30 years who are not
Red Guards 5.7 million
in the Reserve Military Training Unit)
Approx. Advanced middle-school military organization
Red Youth Guard
1 million (boys and girls aged 14 –16 years)
Approx. Bodyguard Command, Logistics Mobilization Guidance Bureau,
Paramilitary units
320,000 etc.
North Korea has a stockpile of war supplies, including food, oil, and ammunition, that can
last one to three months during wartime. More than 300 munitions factories are expected to
operate during wartime because civilian factories designated for transformation into armament
factories are capable of switching to a wartime mobilization mode in a short period. These
armament factories are believed to be capable of producing most types of ammunition and
equipment except combat aircraft. However, without external assistance, North Korea’s ability
to sustain a prolonged war is likely to be limited.
Section 3 North Korean Situation and Military Threats 35